living in islam

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by Akbar S. Ahmed
Excerpts from: Living Islam, From Samarkand to Stornoway, by Akbar S. Ahmed, Published by
BBC Books Limited, Woodlands, 80 Wood Lane, London, U.K. W12 0TT©1993. This book
accompanied the BBC television series "Living Islam" which was first broadcast in 1993.
Reflections on Family Issues
The Muslim family
The central institution of Muslim society is the family.
In the West, the Muslim family structure is often seen
as oppressive and backward, an obstacle to
modernity. For their part, many Muslims are
concerned about the frequent breakdown of
marriages in the West, and worry that their own
societies may be heading along a similar route.
Muslim families today have to cope with the problems
of rapid urbanization, and the pressures of living in
cities and in cramped accommodation. Although
there has been an alarming increase in the divorce
rate among Muslims, none the less Muslim marriages
tend to be far more stable than Western ones,
because they are based on an entirely different set
of assumptions.
These assumptions are founded in the Muslim
notion of the cosmos. As there is order and balance
in the universe, there is a similar natural pattern in
society which is reflected in the Muslim household.
In a conceptual sense, one mirrors the other. Thus
each individual member plays an equally significant
role in his or her own capacity which is related to the
other members of the family. Each person is special
and yet different. It is the difference that ensures the
balance and harmony.
The proper behaviour of all the members of the
family is constantly emphasized in the Qur'an and
Hadith. Ideal behaviour encourages dignity and
modesty in the family. The father, the mother, the
children and the elders all have a positive and
defined role to play. In each case the model of ideal
behaviour comes from early Islam. The Prophet was
both the ideal son and later the ideal husband and
father. The women of his household - like Khadijah
and Fatimah - provide the ideal for Muslim women.
For Muslims, then, the family is the central
institution; it is at the centre both of theology and
sociology: 'The family is a divinely-inspired institution
that came into existence with the creation of man.
The human race is a product of this institution and
not the other way round' (Ahmad 1974: 13). Not
surprisingly, the most intricate rules and regulations
guide family life. About a third of the legal injunctions
in the Qur'an deal with family matters. These aim to
produce the attitudes and behaviour patterns that
Islam wants to foster in society. And they cover
different generations: a Muslim family is an extended
family, normally with three or four generations within
its circle.
Islam is the religion of equality. This principle is
never more explicit than in the Quranic instructions
to men and women on how to become good Muslims,
'If any do deeds of righteousness - be they male or
female - and V have faith, they will enter Heaven'
(Surah 4: verse 124). In Surah 33, verse 35, the
equality of men and women, the need for both to
believe, to speak the truth, to be humble, to give
alms, to fast and to be modest, is emphasized by
constant repetition of the words 'men . . . and women
. . .'
Even in the controversial area of divorce it is
necessary to point out that both men and women
have the right to divorce. The first divorce initiated by
a woman was granted by the Prophet himself on
grounds of incompatibility. This gives women
tremendous leverage in society.
At the same time, men have duties towards the
women of the family. A wife must be maintained by
her husband, even if she has means other own. This
practice is used to explain the inequality of
inheritance - a man receives a larger share of a
family legacy than does a woman.
Muslims are known to be extremely affectionate
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towards their offspring. Little girls and boys are
constantly spoilt, sometimes to the point where it is
harmful to them. In particular grandparents dote on
grandchildren. As the young are loved, the aged are
revered. With age people gain in status and
influence. It is the duty of every child to care for
parents: 'Show kindness to parents . . . Lower to
them the wing of humility out of tenderness' (Surah
17: verses 23-4).
Mothers in particular evoke a very strong
emotional response of affection among Muslims.
Heaven, the Prophet had said, lies beneath the feet
of the mother. The following lines were dedicated by
me as a young man to my mother:
When I walk at night alone,
in the deep wadis of her sobs
or when I know that each time I drive fast
or delay reply to her letter
when I know that at midnight
she sits up praying to her God
to keep me warm and whole,
when I know that she will still bless me
though I give her eyes cause to tears
when I know that all my warts and ways
will turn to gold at her simple touch
then I see through her the God she sits
rotating her beads to
and then I know that her God
will always be there for me to reach out and
touch.
Arranged marriages
As most young Western couples select their own
marriage partners, the arranged marriage appears
odd and outdated to them. Although most Muslim
marriages are arranged even today this does not
mean that marriages are forced upon young people.
What it does mean is that parents and senior
relatives often discuss various possibilities, yet all the
while consulting the person involved. This allows
them, over a period of time, to assess the
weaknesses and strengths of the future partner. In
Islam both partners must clearly and before
witnesses agree to be married; no one can be
coerced into marriage. Usually marriages take place
within the extended family or even the same ethnic or
tribal group. It is difficult in such marriages for
husbands to be mean or cruel to their wives because
husband and wife are related and such behaviour
would cause adverse comment in the family. After all
the uncles and aunts of the wife would also be the
uncles and aunts of the husband. Arranged
marriages are perhaps one of the reasons why
Muslim marriages are so stable. There are few
comparative statistics but many young Muslims even
in the West enthusiastically support the notion of
arranged marriages, particularly in the light of the
high statistics of divorce in the West.
Are arranged marriages still viable among
Muslims living in Western societies or highly
Westernized families in Muslim cities? We already
hear of more divorce cases in this generation than in
the previous one. Is this a trend? If so, will the trend
spread to the more traditional rural areas also? Does
it indicate a breakdown of the arranged marriage
system? These are questions that need to be
addressed by all Muslims today.
Muslim dress and the hijab
Islamic clothing affects Islamic thinking and vice
versa. As the Qur'an teaches modesty for both men
and women (Surah 24: verses 30-1) clothes are
meant to emphasize modesty and dignity both in men
and in women. Thus clothes that either suggest the
contours of the body or expose it are avoided except,
perhaps, among some members of the fashionable,
the young or those who live in cities.
Modesty is also behaviour, speech and conduct.
It is in this context that respectable men and women
wear clothes that appear formal and dignified. They
need to cover all parts of their body. Flowing robes
are probably the best method to do so. To see a
sheikh or an ayatollah in his robes is to see a
person of dignity, learning, authority and grace in his
own society. Loose clothes are worn because they
allow people to say prayers which include
prostration, bending and sitting. It is not easy to do
these things in tight-fitting clothes. Loose clothes are
also worn because of dietary patterns. Most Muslims,
because they are often up early at dawn for prayers,
tend to rest in the afternoon; for most the afternoon
meal is usually heavy, and the midday sun makes
work difficult. There is also the forces of tradition.
People often tend to wear what the previous
generation wore before them. It does not mean that
there is no change. Even in the rural areas of
Pakistan, men and women once wore pyjamas or
shalwars which ran literally into yards and yards of
cloth. Now the shalwar is much tighter and neater,
although to outsiders it looks very baggy.
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Muslim women appear to be divided on the
subject of the veil. The covering of the face by a veil
has never been universal in the Muslim world.
Country women go to the fields without a veil, women
in some parts of the Muslim world have not adopted
it, others during the last decades have discarded it,
yet others rediscovered it. But the Quranic injunction
to modesty, however it is applied, cannot be set
aside. Its interpretation has varied, and does vary,
but its importance is basic. One interpretation of
what constitutes modesty is the long skirt and
headscarf worn by many young women - a stricter
interpretation than that of some of their mothers. The
hijab or veil presents us with some useful
sociological insights into Muslim society. Its source
as an Islamic dress is debated. 'The true veil is in
the eyes of the men' is a saying of the Prophet.
Tribal society, as Arabia was in the seventh century
when Islam came to it, would have two or three
distinct features regarding women which we can
reflect on with a degree of accuracy. Women would
have been far more free than we can imagine. This
is a tribal characteristic. People are related on the
genealogical charter and everyone knows everyone
else. Molesting a woman or raping her would mean
committing virtual incest.
Although the notions of female honour and
sexual conduct are highly developed in the Muslim
tribal areas, there is no concept of the veil, which
begins to appear once you come nearer the towns.
Indeed a woman in the tribal areas will come up and
shake hands and say, 'How are you, brother, would
you like a cup of tea?' She has the kind of
confidence which would be difficult to find in her
better-educated sister in the city. Although the hijab,
chador or even the pardah are not in early Islam
according to some scholars, in time they became
associated with Islam. These customs were
assimilated from the conquered Persian and
Byzantine societies and were considered to reflect
the Quranic spirit. It may well be that seclusion and
veiling reflected the upper-class, urban women who
would protect themselves from the gaze of those in
the bazaars and in the fields. Over the centuries,
however, this spread to other parts of society. In
certain groups it had unfortunate consequences.
Women in towns and cities were often confined to
small houses with limited social contacts and
therefore barred from community life.
Professor Nur Veergin, Professor of Sociology
in Istanbul, although intensely supportive of Islam, is
scathing about the long black chador or veil, even
blaming it on Christianity. She explained her
argument to me:
"I must say that these categories have been
influenced by Christianity. For instance the veil. It's
claimed that horrible black chador that one sees now
more and more in Istanbul streets is something to do
with Islam, that has nothing to do with Turkish Islam
anyway. It comes from Byzant [Christianity], it
comes from Iran, but it certainly doesn't derive,
doesn't stem from the Turkish national culture or the
Islamic culture of Turkey."
The hijab in the 1980s and 1990s has become a
fashionable and recognizable symbol of Muslim
identity among young girls. It must be emphasized
that it is not worn out of fear or pressure from the
home. Many girls wear this in spite of opposition at
home. It is a neat way of saying: 'this is where I
stand and I am proud of it.'
Let us end this chapter by emphasizing a crucial
point that must be borne in mind when considering
Muslim responses to modernity. Western
commentators commonly make the assumption that
once Muslims are set on the path to democracy (and
modernity) they will become more like 'us' and, as in
most of the West, eventually separate the religious
from the secular in their lives. Yet Muslims are either
Muslims or they are not; there is no halfway house.
They cannot just take bits and pieces of Islam and
still remain Muslims. If they do, they become
something completely different. Evidence of this is
most explicit where Muslims live as a minority in
non-Muslim states, and we shall discuss this in the
next chapter.
Polygamy in Islam
There is another idea about family life that is difficult
to lay to rest in the West. It is of Islam as a man's
paradise with every man possessing at least four
wives. This is, of course, a stereotype and not a real
image. In my anthropological fieldwork in Pakistan
which cast a wide net over an entire section of a
major tribal group (the Frontier Pukhtuns) I
discovered that only 0.02 per cent of men were
polygamous (Ahmed 1980). Personally, too, apart
from one or two people in the older generation, I
know of no friend or acquaintance who has more
than one wife. The vast majority of men are
monogamous.
In Islam it is always important to look for the
spirit behind the word or' law - whether it is in
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criminal punishment or polygamy. The fact that a
man is allowed in extraordinary circumstances to
marry up to four wives must be seen in this context.
It is quite clear that the ideal is one wife, and the
Qur'an emphasizes and indeed advocates it.
However, there are situations in times of war or
famine or social upheaval when it is better that a
woman is safely' and honourably married than has to
fend for herself as a destitute or even prostitute her
body. It is therefore the spirit that must be
understood, not the letter of the law.
The Qur'an has clearly given permission for men
to marry more than once, and in certain
circumstances this is a social necessity: "If you are
afraid that you will not treat orphans justly, then
marry such women that may seem good to you,
two, three or four" (Surah 4: verse 3). But in the next
line the Qur'an lays down a clause: "If you think you
will not act justly, then one." This is a stringent
condition making it difficult for a person to marry
more than once. Indeed the Qur'an itself says tha
polygamy is not possible:" "You will never manage to
deal equitably with women no matter how hard you
try" (Surah 4: verse 129). The true spirit of the
Qur'an thus appears to be of monogamy, because
marriage to more than one wife is contingent on
absolute equality and impartiality between wives.
Nonetheless, Muslims are not apologetic or
defensive about polygamy. A liberated, female Indian
Muslim writer makes the following point while
supporting polygamy in Islam:
Islam accommodates human weaknesses and needs.
It aims to create a society based on natural instincts.
It sanctions re-marriage and divorce but discourages
flagrant immorality and sex outside marriage.
Polygamy is aprovision and not a compulsion. The
Western pattern and definition of women's liberation
is not the only one. If a woman is content with being
a second wife why should anyone tell her she should
feel otherwise? Polygamy provides a hedge for
increased female population due to disasters like
wars. The clause legitimizing multiple wives is in the
interest of 'the other woman' as it gives her moral,
social and legal rights. One man one woman
relationship is merely an Anglo-Saxon concept of
purity.
The oppression of Muslim women in the
sub-continent is a result of feudal-social attitudes and
has nothing to do with Islam. Some of the laws in
these countries are detrimental to women and need
to be reviewed in the Muslim framework. Islamic
jurisprudence provides the liberal and progressive
basis for a moral and ajust society in recorded
history. (Dehivi 1992)
Marriage in Islam is not a temporary union and
is meant to last for life. Dissolution of marriage is,
however, permitted if it has irretrievably broken
down. However, before actual divorce, Muslim law
demands an attempt at reconciliation. The natural
prevalence of monogamy as normal is more and
more the practice in Muslim countries. Nevertheless,
a limited polygamy is seen as a realistic need in
certain circumstances, and indeed as preferable to
the concealed polygamy without responsibility, in
some ways tolerated in Western society. Islam is a
practical religion and is meant for the guidance of
human beings made of flesh and bones' (Ahmad
1974: 21-2).
Islam in the Age of the Western Media
Islam in The Age of The Western Media
By the end of the 1980s the world had changed
dramatically. And the causes of change crept up on
us quietly, almost without our noticing. The main
developments concern widespread use of the
audio-visual media. These include video, fax and
satellite communications technology. In the context of
the global political situation, in which the USA has
emerged as the master of the age, these
developments assume a special cultural significance.
Islam And The West: Confrontation or
Consensus?
In the 1990s America and its cultural allies (like the
countries of Europe) appear to dominate the world.
They do so through the media. That is why the media
is seen as hostile by the Muslim world. Anything from
the West is regarded as potentially threatening; this
creates neurosis and suspicion. Anyone associating
with the West is seen as an agent, a representative
of the CIA. It is the gut reaction and bizarre
response of a people repeatedly humiliated and let
down by the West. It is not the response of Islamic
civilization which has survived over a millennium and
produced some of the most enduring cultural
systems ever seen.
The West, dominated by North America and
Western Europe but also including countries such as
Japan, is the driving force in the new global culture.
The standards of living of many of their citizens have
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never been so high in history. But they have little to
offer those outside their borders. Indeed, they would
close their borders to outsiders. The notions of
'fortress USA' and 'fortress Europe' are just
beginning to develop and will certainly grow in the
coming time. Strong notions of race and social
superiority are embedded in these countries and can
very easily translate into dangerous political
philosophies. We see the Nazi salute and ideology
openly displayed in Germany once again. This was
unthinkable even a few years ago. Once again the
cries against Jews and foreigners are thick in the
air, as crude racism re-emerges in Europe,
including France and Britain. Once again
immigration laws are debated and are being made
stricter. So into the next millennium the dominant
Western nations will wish to maintain a tightly run
island of prosperity to be protected from the hordes
of the hungry and restless wishing to join them.
Then there is the Islamic world. In its population
and its resources it is potentially capable of forming
a major world presence. Its politics, however, remain
volatile. Its leadership still requires vision and
stability. Its own thinkers still require clarity. It is for
this reason that Western journalists find it easy to
label groups of Muslim countries as an arc of crisis,
or an Islamic crescent of crisis, and dismiss them.
They take some Muslim countries and connect them
across Asia or Africa; so Central Asia, Afghanistan,
Iran, Iraq and Turkey form a crescent. This is a
journalistic cliché.
Correctly or not, Muslims perceive the Western
media as hostile. Many factors explain this sense of
discomfort. The general attitude of hostility is largely
true. Western programmes about Muslims are often
slanted to suggest negative images of Muslims. Many
carry messages of political instability and the poor
treatment of women - the two notorious Orientalist
prejudices against Islam.
The restless generation coming of age in Muslim
societies is another factor. It has grown up with the
media and feels familiar with American culture. It is
ambiguous about what it sees: it cannot live by the
American standards it observes, yet paradoxically it
wants them. It also feels contempt for much of what
it sees on television (particularly sex and violence)
and believes it to be representative of American
society. Frustrated, it finds its only legitimate sense
of identity in its own traditional civilization, which is
Islam. This generation therefore emphasizes its
Islamic identity by rejecting the West.
As we know, Islam is not the only religion
experiencing a resurgence. There has been a rise of
religious revivalism throughout the world. This has
often taken new expressions, sometimes aggressive
ones. Whether evangelical Christianity in the USA or
Hinduism in India, this phenomenon of revivalism is
peculiar to our age. Notions of the secular, of
progress and of science which many took for
granted a generation ago are being challenged.
Another factor is that Muslim societies appear to
be experiencing problems with the contemporary
world and its ethos based on speed, cynicism and
disbelief. Islam recommends balance and a steady
pace. There is also the noise and dazzle of the
media. Again, Islam emphasizes quiet, meditation
and simplicity. The family itself is under attack in
today's world. Islam emphasizes the family as the
key unit of society and would safeguard it at all
costs. Most important, Muslims believe in God in an
age dominated by materialism and agnosticism or
atheism.
Further, people have already been predicting
that after the collapse of communism the West's next
enemy would be Islam. Now that there are no more
powerful enemies for the West to conquer since the
break-up of its main adversary, the USSR, Islam
alone remains in its path, preventing final world
supremacy. There is a growing feeling among writers
and commentators that the world is heading for a
final show-down, a final crusade, between Islam and
the West.
Because there is so much anger and frustration,
there is little analytic or objective thought around
Islam; there is little sense of working out solutions, of
pondering on problems, in a global context. There is
sometimes despair and at other times a wild attempt
at striking at the enemy. Not unnaturally, this
prevents understanding, analysis or communication.
The Muslim failure with the media
Anyone today with access to a television, radio or
newspaper will have been recently inundated with
negative images of Muslims. The controversy
regarding The Satanic Verses, the Gulf War and the
collapse of the BCCI are three examples of the
media focusing attention on Muslims and causing
heated argument. Through the drama that
surrounded the author and the novel, the way the
Gulf War developed and was fought, and the story of
the bank, Muslims all over the world were forced to
engage in a debate with non-Muslims and indeed
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with other Muslims. With media descriptions of a
'criminal culture,' to many in the West Islam
appeared to be a force for anarchy and disorder.
Some of the main questions in the media about
Muslims that related to the above examples were: Is
the burning of books a standard Muslim response to
literature they don't approve of? Does this mean
Muslims do not prize knowledge and learning? Are
Muslim leaders merely dictators who invade and
occupy smaller neighbours forcibly? Are Muslim
businessmen only capable of fraud? What are
Muslims really like? Muslims themselves were angry
and bewildered by the extent and intensity of the
criticism. While they did not approve of The Satanic
Verses, most did not wish to kill the author; while
many did not support the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq,
they felt it was high time someone challenged the
bullying attitude of the West; and while they were
shocked at the extent of corruption in the BCCI, and
many lost their deposits, they nevertheless felt that
the manner of its public exposure was partly
motivated by a deliberate attempt to humiliate Islam.
In the age of the media, of the sound bite, of
television images, Muslims have not yet found a way
of expressing themselves adequately. Their leaders
- whether Gaddafi or Saddam - rely too much on
mob oratory and controlled television appearances
which appear artificial and ineffective in the West.
Besides, the vernacular translates poorly. Hyperbole
may be thought appropriate for the mob gathered in
the Muslim city - wiping the enemy from the face of
the earth, the mother of battles which would claim
thousands of lives, and so on - but it translates badly
in the international press. Muslim leaders either
appear as military dictators ordering the chopping of
hands and the whipping of the poor (Zia in Pakistan
and Nimeiri in Sudan) or as tribal tyrants (Arab
rulers) or as socialist dictators (Saddam in Iraq and
Assad in Syria).
There seem to be two distinct Muslim responses
to the Western media in the 1990s. I will give two
examples from Pakistan. One response is mimicry,
to accept Western culture, indeed to reflect and
further it, often unthinkingly. The weekly paper,
Friday Times (Lahore), and the monthly magazine,
Herald (Karachi), both in English, are edited by
Oxbridge/London University journalists who provide
useful and often penetrating political commentary.
But they also faithfully echo Western jargon and
ideas. Even the word 'fundamentalist' is used, without
a trace of self-consciousness, to describe fellow
Pakistanis; indeed it is often abbreviated to 'fundo'.
Both carry detailed and regular commentary on the
latest videos and pop songs coming from America.
Pop stars like Madonna are frequently featured. The
other response, also from Pakistan, is that of the
Jamaat-i-Islami political party. A member
announced in public that if Madonna or Michael
Jackson were to be invited to Pakistan the party
would not only agitate against the government for
allowing the invitations but ensure that the functions
were disrupted. More zealous members promised to
break the legs of those who participated.
While one reaction was to absorb without
thought what was coming from the West, the other
was total rejection. (They were echoing the two
separate streams of education I pointed out in
chapter 4.) But are these really well-thought out,
balanced and serious responses? Will they be
long-term? Do they solve anything? Do they help us
to understand better the relationship between Islam
and the West?
Muslims have yet to discover how to use the media to
project ideas and images of their own culture and
civilization. A perfect example comes from Muslim
Spain. Although the King of Spain has dutifully
apologized to Jews for what his ancestors did to
them in the fifteenth century with the fall of Granada,
he has not apologized to Muslims. It is known that he
is keen to build bridges but still awaits a Muslim
initiative on the matter. From this it appears that
Muslims who are so acutely aware of the loss of
Andalusia in their popular literary culture find it
difficult to translate this into realpolitik and
international diplomacy. The failure to do so has cost
them heavy. They are always lagging behind in the
world, and the injustices inflicted on them are barely
mentioned.
Another example comes from Afghanistan. We
have discussed the mujahid as the equivalent of a
Muslim Zorro figure. But in the Western media the
word means different things in different times and
places. Mujahid in the Middle Eastern context is a
young man with a Kalashnikov wearing battle
fatigues, his face covered by a Palestinian scarf,
taking a Western hostage. A mujahid in Afghanistan
was a heroic tribesman fighting the Soviets. There
were thus different interpretations, different
responses to the same person fighting for the same
cause: the right to self-determination and dignity.
But the media is fickle. Once hailed as the
giant-killers, those that successfully fought a
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superpower, the Afghan mujahidin in the wake of the
new world order find themselves discarded. The
Americans now see little need for them. Afghanistan
is still in a state of turmoil, one-third of the population
wiped out and the remaining scarred physically and
mentally by one of the most savage confrontations in
modern times. The Afghans find themselves at a loss.
The Gulf War and the media
When they came out of the Arabian desert in the
seventh century, Muslims had little besides horses
and faith. It was this faith that scattered the more
established and powerful armies before them. It was
a time when faith could sweep all before it, and that
lesson was never forgotten. In 1991 in the Gulf War
we saw how things had changed. The Iraqis could
not even come near the enemy as death rained down
from the skies thousands of feet above. It was
impossible even to hold one's own against a superior
technological force. It was a pitiful spectacle, a
massacre.
It is a truism that the media are used as a
weapon in today's world. I was in Britain during the
war and I watched television and read the
newspapers closely. In the first few days there was
a complete blackout of news reported from the Arab
side. Television channels broadcast a number of
discussion programmes with some very distinguished
participants. Because the Western media had built
up the war as a major conflict between two largely
balanced forces it was difficult to separate reality
from illusion. Saddam 's army (the fourth largest in
the world), Saddam's nuclear potential, Saddam's
Scud missiles and Saddam's super-gun were
constantly paraded before us. It was going to be a
bloody and prolonged fight.
The reality was totally different. Some of the most
powerful nations in the world had combined their
forces to lure, fight and destroy a Third World
power. And at best Iraq was nothing more than a
Third World power. Its armies had not even
succeeded in penetrating beyond the borders into
Iran in the long war in the 1980s. This was in spite of
the full backing of the West and indeed the Arabs
who wished to prevent the Iranian revolution from
spilling into their areas.
However, watching the war on television one had
the impression that this was going to be a repeat of
the Second World War. Saddam had been elevated
to the rank of a Hitler - indeed the word was
commonly bandied around. Then there was the
completely one sided nature of the commentary and
analysis. No brown or black faces were to be seen
on the discussion - panels in the early days.
Furthermore, not only Iraqis but Arabs by extension
became the enemy. It became the war of the white
man against the brown one, the European and
American against the Arab. By further extension it
soon became the war of the West against Muslims.
This equation, looking back coldly now, appears
astonishing. And yet it happened and is true.
Because of this identification of Muslims as the
enemy, numerous incidents were reported of
Muslims being taunted, beaten and abused in the
UK. The irony of picking on a Bangladeshi in the
London Underground, a man who had nothing to do
with Saddam and his politics or indeed the Middle
East, did not strike those who vented their anger
against Muslims. Even Indians were not spared. The
further irony of an Indian - perhaps a Hindu - being
taunted as a Saddam supporter strikes us as
ludicrous now but created an uncomfortable
atmosphere during the war. I was aware of the
seriousness of the situation because I was one of a
group of Muslims invited to call on the junior Foreign
Minister, Douglas Hogg, at the Foreign Office. The
delegation conveyed some of the apprehensions of
the beleaguered Muslim community in the UK at the
height of the war. A long list of incidents that had
taken place over the last few days was presented to
the minister. This included women being spat at,
pushed and abused because they were easily
identified as Muslim (wearing a hijab or
shalwar-kameez). In the public mind anyone who
even looked remotely Muslim was supposed to be a
supporter of Saddam .
This atmosphere created a siege mentality within
the Muslim community. Muslims began to feel their
loyalty was on test. Many opposed Saddam and his
policies, but there were many others who did not
necessarily approve of him yet saw in him a man
who had the courage to stand up to the West. The
television discussion programmes in the West at first
did not allow the opposite point of view. Not only were
there very few speakers who could represent the
Muslim point of view but they were rarely given a
chance. Those that did appear sympathetic to
Muslims were dismissed as the loony left or
romantics who knew nothing of political reality. In
one such British television programme in which I
appeared the distinguished panellists virtually
dismissed Victoria Brittain simply because she
8
expressed pro-Arab sentiments and wrote for the
Guardian newspaper (although the latter probably
created greater animosity than her support for the
Arabs in some of the conservative panellists -
particularly since the Guardian consistently opposed
the Gulf War). There was no doubt that the Muslim
point of view was not only marginalised but was not
allowed to be represented. On Channel 4's Midnight
Special programme, I found that positions were often
firmly taken before discussions and then firmly held.
There was little attempt at exchange of ideas or even
dialogue; and these were extremely distinguished
people: MPs, air marshals and experts. However, I
also found that some of the famous names showed
unexpected sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi
people. Harold Pinter, for example, spoke strongly in
support of the underdog. He was, of course, roundly
attacked by most members of the panel.
It was quite clear that whoever controlled the
media could project how the war was being fought.
More important, they could project why the war was
being fought. The other side was simply not given a
chance. Even untrue stories could be cooked up or
true stories be presented in a manner that blurred
reality. We were shown the savage bombing of a
building in Baghdad that killed hundreds of civilians
in the basement. We were not sure what happened.
We were told that this was a military target. It was
only through the emotional voice and the disturbed
eyes of the British television reporter who went in
and saw the carnage that we were aware that
something terrible had happened. Hospitals, bridges,
homes - the very fabric of society was being
demolished. For each news item we had to use a
method of calculation, to make adjustments, to arrive
at the truth.
But there were other extraordinary developments
in the Muslim world itself that needed to be explained.
Although many Muslim governments supported the
West against Saddam , the people were with him. It
was a strange phenomenon, this support for
Saddam. Muslims were aware that he was far from
the ideal Muslim ruler - that, in fact, he was a tyrant
created by the West and supported in the 1980s to
stem Iran's Islamic revolution. Yet in Pakistan and
Egypt, although the governments sided with the
Western allies, the people took to the streets in
support of Saddam. The Supreme Council of British
Muslims met in Bradford and unanimously supported
Saddam. His posters became the most popular item
throughout the Muslim world. Suddenly Saddam was
being seen as another Nasser, even another Saladin,
who stood up to the West. Although Saddam was
neither of these, he had assumed an almost mythical
status. So intense was the sense of humiliation and
anger among Muslims that they would even rally
behind the devil himself if he stood up to the West.
This is not only a disturbing explanation but an
uncomfortable reality.
Media encouragement of Muslim orthodoxy
There is a causal relationship between the Western
media and the orthodox position in Islam. Ironically,
the media encourage what they set out to deflate. Let
me explain. Until the availability of modern
technology which would link distant parts of the
world, Muslim societies were culturally diverse. The
Qur'an and the Shar'iah provided guidelines but local
practice often varied. So the most colourful
syntheses of cultures are recorded from one end of
the Muslim world to the other. In due course these
became part of Islamic observance. Unchallenged,
they were accepted as custom.
Today, however, nothing can go unchallenged
because everything is public. Within minutes,
accounts of the behaviour of a Muslim group in one
part of the world can be flashed to another. This has
given the main centres of orthodoxy unimaginable
powder and has allowed them to act and behave as
the guardians of orthodoxy in a manner unthinkable
and practically impossible only a few years ago.
Looking at South Asian Muslim customs, we
observe that many of them are derived from Islam's
close contact with Hinduism. Over the centuries
these have become part of Muslim custom. But their
absorption into Islam alarmed Muslim scholars. In the
eighteenth century the Muslim scholar and reformer.
Shah Waliullah, emphasized the need for Muslims to
reject these customs. But his voice, although
powerful and respected, was nonetheless a single
voice. His following and his writing had an impact,
but it was limited to the literate. Today the power of
the media is such that any custom which is deemed
to be abhorrent or unorthodox can be exposed to
literally millions of people through the media. It is
therefore much more difficult to practise something
that is not officially sanctioned or accepted by the
orthodox. Sufism provides an interesting example. It
is increasingly under attack by the orthodox. The
media images of Sufism as a corrupt, decadent cult
attracting hippy figures do not help. Sufism has
already been under attack over the last century by
9
modernizing Muslims who absorbed Western
scientific and enlightenment concepts. Arab leaders
with socialist ideas, like Nasser, have also attempted
to suppress it.
Although Sufism in its purest forms is traced
directly to the Prophet himself, and some of the
greatest Muslim figures have been inclined towards
Sufism, the more distorted forms attracted much
contemporary criticism. Tomb worship, saint worship
and stories of miraculous powers have contributed to
the disrepute that Sufism now seems to have fallen
into. However, this does not mean that Sufism is to
be rejected in its entirety. It is one of the most
endearing faces of Islam. Its philosophy of universal
love, of universal peace, sulh-i-kul, is one of the
most powerful and attractive messages it has for our
age. Besides, its orthodoxy cannot be challenged.
The Sufi's first task is to master the Shar'iah, a Sufi
must first be orthodox before he can go on to the
stage of mystical achievement.
Yet Sufism stands as a discredited force
particularly among the younger generation. This is
for several reasons. The strictly orthodox Wahabis of
Saudi Arabia believe that much of Sufism is little
more than mumbo-jumbo, a deviance from the
straight path. They are especially critical of the
notion of intermediaries between man and God. They
believe that power attaches to God alone and not to
human beings. Not even the holy Prophet has any
special status apart from the fact that he is the last
messenger of God. Some extreme sections of the
Wahabis would even go as far as discouraging
visitors to the tomb of the Prophet because it attracts
worshippers who in turn begin to worship the tomb
rather than God.
This is logical and correct. But, like all
philosophies carried to an extreme, it can create
problems on the ground. It produces a rigidity which
does not allow for alternative explanations. Backed
by the power of scholarship, funding and
propaganda, it can easily convince the younger
generation that anyone accused of being a Sufi is
little short of indulging in shirk, attributing a partner to
God, one of the most serious crimes in Islam. I have
heard accusations against some of the most
respected and saintly figures in contemporary Islam
who were suspected of having Sufistic leanings.
These people would in turn chuckle and say, 'May
God give Muslims better understanding.'
The media play their part in discouraging
Sufism. It is not easy to convey the Sufistic message
in the media. The hidden meanings of the saints,
mystical powers and esoteric images do not translate
easily. The image is far more powerful than the
message. A Sufi is easily reduced to a Hollywood
caricature.
The other Muslim position, the more formal and
orthodox, is paradoxically enough boosted by the
Western media. Images of crowds yelling
anti-Western slogans and pictures of militant young
men capturing embassies or blowing up planes do
not discourage other young Muslims. On the
contrary they attract them. It gives them a sense of
identity, a pride in their cause. They are striking a
blow for Islam, for the glory of their religion. They
are prepared to make any kind of sacrifice and
indeed it is on the news all over the world. This is
acknowledgement. So the media play a role in
assisting one form of Islam as against another,
however unwittingly.
The Western bogeyman: Islamic fundamentalism
What is this so-called Islamic fundamentalism? Why
is it becoming such a force in world politics today?
Islamic fundamentalism is an imprecise and elusive
term which attempts to convey contemporary Islamic
revivalism and resurgence. Certain features of this
phenomenon can be identified. There is a belief that
Islam is a comprehensive way of life, that it includes
society, politics and economics. There is also a
belief that the failure of Muslims is due to their
departure from the straight path of Islam and their
infatuation with Western secularism and its
materialist ideology. Then it is felt that the renewal of
society necessitates a return to Islam, which draws
its inspiration directly from the Qur'an and the
Prophet. Many Muslims also believe that, in order to
create a truly Islamic order, the present
Western-inspired civil and criminal codes must be
replaced by more Islamic ones. Westernization is
condemned but modernization is not; science and
technology are therefore accepted, but they need to
be subordinated to Islamic belief. The process of
Islamization itself requires organization and
association of dedicated and trained Muslims who
will struggle in jihad against corruption and social
injustice. However, some go beyond this set of
beliefs. They see the West as continuing the
Crusades against Muslims with the Crusader
mentality. They reject even their own Muslim
governments because they are not inspired by the
Shar'iah. While accepting that the Christians and
10
Jews are people of the Book, their links with Western
colonialism and Zionism make them unbelievers.
Many factors feed into this Islamic revivalism.
Most significant are the rapid developments in
communications which link up Bradford with
Islamabad, Washington with Cairo, connecting
Muslims living in the West to their own societies.
There are also visiting scholars, diplomats and
travellers. This is why when the explosion took place
around The Satanic Verses in Bradford a movement
developed rapidly among Muslims all over the world.
In Bombay and in Islamabad Muslims were killed
protesting against the book. Benazir Bhutto, who had
just assumed the office of Prime Minister, said,
'Salman Rushdie almost sank me.' Never before in
history could the problems of an author living across
the world have had such an effect on the politics of
a country like Pakistan.
There is also a sociological factor. We note a
polarization in Muslim society which often leads to
conflict. Neither extreme is desirable: neither
integration, for it implies the blurring of borders
which would in the end deny a separate Muslim
identity; nor isolation, for Islam is not and cannot be
isolationist with its emphasis on the universal and the
global. But the tensions of the times have created the
crisis of polarization, and the lack of leadership
among Muslims has allowed it to grow to the point of
mutual incomprehension.
World politics have also contributed to the growth
of the phenomenon. From the Muslim perspective it
is important to understand that during the Cold War
both the USA and the USSR were equally suspect in
their dealings with the Muslim world. The Muslim
perspective was best summed up by Khomeini's
dictum na sharq na gharb, neither East nor West.
During the 1950s and 1960s the USSR threatened
Muslims. One of my memories as a young
undergraduate in Pakistan is Khrushchev's drawing
a circle around Peshawar in Pakistan threatening to
wipe it out with a nuclear attack. Syria and Iraq fell to
a local variant of communism and the results were
disastrous. It was feared that if the USA removed its
protection many other Muslim countries would fall to
the Soviet Union. Then, in the 1970s, things began to
change.
When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979,
it was expected that like so many dominoes the
surrounding states of Iran and Pakistan would be the
next to fall. But the Afghans stood their ground, and
eventually the USSR packed up and went home. This
was followed by the complete break-up of the USSR,
which in turn led to the emergence of six new Muslim
states. Not unnaturally, this sequence of events was
linked by Muslims to their own vision of Islamic
destiny. For Muslims it was the triumph of their faith
against Godless Russia; the inevitable victory of good
over evil. - With the collapse of the USSR, Muslims
believed that the USA alone remained as the major
force hostile to Muslims. However, we must
emphasize that not all Muslims accept conflict with
the USA as inevitable. Many nations have close ties
with the USA, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan.
In considering why Islam is becoming more of a
world force today, we need to explain what is
happening to make countries like Algeria - once
firmly secular - turn to Islam. Algeria itself is an
interesting example because it was one of the first
Muslim countries to achieve independence from a
European colonial power. After a heroic struggle
which cost millions of lives, it then set itself on the
path to secular democracy. Having rid itself of the
French it would try to become as far as possible
French. The paradox was not resolved. It was simply
frozen.
All this, however, did not meet the economic and
political aspirations of the ordinary Algerian. A
generation later Algeria seemed to have got
nowhere. Worse: in the process it began to lose its
own sense of identity. Horror stories of the treatment
of Arabs in France further alienated Algerians from
the French model. Questions were raised: if we are
to be totally French and yet the French despise us
there must be something wrong? Where do we look
for another identity? Is the answer in our own culture
and religion? The alternative source of identity was,
of course, Islam. It was always there. Earlier it had
simply been assumed. Now the present generation of
Algerian leaders began to examine it seriously and
discovered in the process that there were many
Algerians thinking along these lines.
"Islamic revivalism,' 'Islamic resurgence,' 'Islamic
movement' - we imagine these are new and peculiar
to our age. We think we are understanding
something happening in the world by labelling Muslim
expressions thus. In fact these very terms are as old
as Islam itself. Islam is nothing short of an endless
revolution, the eternal quest to reach out to God. It is
the universal desire of human beings to pose the
eternal questions and attempt their answers in our
brief span here on earth.
11
Concluding Thoughts
A hundred years ago Muslim lands were under the
European colonial powers. Muslim capitals such as
Algiers and Cairo were occupied. Those that were
not, like Kabul and Tehran, were under the influence
of one or other power. It was the nadir of Muslim
political fortunes. Today, a hundred years later, there
are about fifty Muslim states, almost a billion Muslims
in the world (with, significantly, about ten million
Muslims in the West).
Islamic symbolism remains high among Muslims.
Constitutions are declared Islamic and flags bear an
Islamic star or crescent. Airlines like Pakistan
International and Gulf Air say a prayer before the
flight when announcing take-off. Major hotels indicate
the direction of Mecca for those of the faithful who
wish to pray in their rooms.
Perhaps because of the global Islamic position
that is forming, there is also a feeling among
non-Muslims that Islam is a threat. Throughout the
world there is confrontation between Muslims and
people of other religions: in South Asia between
Hindus and Muslims (India and Pakistan), in the
Middle East between Jews and Muslims (Israel and
the Arabs), in Africa between Christians and Muslims
(Nigeria and Sudan). Even the disintegration of the
communist states shows how deep-rooted these
divisions are in history. In Bosnia Muslims once
again confront Christians, and in Azerbaijan Azeri
Muslims fight it out with Christian Armenians.
The Andalus syndrome is never far from the
Muslim mind. The sense of injustice, of loss, of the
cruelty of the world is sharp. It is captured by a
South Asian Muslim character in an Urdu novel
commenting on Muslim losses which fuse in his mind
and cause confusion:
The bearded man tried hard to recollect: after a
while, he said, 'all I can remember is that as I was
leaving Granada ... ' '
Granada!' the rest looked up at the bearded man
with a start . . . And the poor old bearded man,
already shocked at their mocking disbelief, felt
utterly distraught at the laughter . . . 'I've been
uprooted,' he remarked dolefully, 'and that's what
matters. What difference does it make now for me
to remember whether it's Granada that I've been
thrown out of, or Bait-al-Muqaddis [Jerusalem], or
Jahanabad, or Kashmir . . .?'
The depth of sadness in his voice had an intensely
melancholy impact on all the men. They drifted into
silence. After a while the bearded man said
tearfully, 'Friends, we left behind all that was once
ours, and now it seems we've even left behind our
memories. ' (Husain 1973:93)
Andalusia, Kashmir, Jerusalem and now Bosnia - the
list of Muslim losses is long. It brings together the
past and the present. It acts as an open wound.
Political injustices, deep-rooted hatreds,
disintegrating empires and overzealous reformers
explain some of the confrontation between Muslims
and non-Muslims today. But it is also to be explained
by the ethnic and religious revivalism all over the
world. It is a revivalism that is still to be understood in
its present global context. We must therefore attempt
to explain the differences that exist between Muslims
and non-Muslims. By doing so we will make some
sense of our different positions. By avoiding it we will
perpetuate the stereotypes and misunderstandings.
There is no reason to assume that differences in
themselves set different civilizations on a collision
course. Indeed, in the plural world that we live in the
differences must be not only tolerated but also
understood.
Muslims in the West
For the last thousand years the West treated Islam
as the 'other,' as 'over there.' In the main this is still
true: the bulk of the Muslim population lives in Africa
and Asia. But today this simple world-view has been
complicated by the presence in the West of over ten
million Muslims. About five or six million Muslims live
in Europe and about four or five million in America;
the exact numbers tend to be somewhat unreliable,
since immigrants and converts sometimes do not
wish to declare their identity or register and are
therefore difficult to enumerate. Muslims living in the
West are theologically in harmony with the Quranic
position. Again and again the Qur'an has
emphasized that God's domain is not restricted by
East or West: it is everywhere. "To Allah belongeth
the East and the West. Whithersoever ye turn there
is Allah's countenance" (Surah 2: verse 115). So
Muslims can practise their religion whether in Cairo
or California, in London or Lahore.
We need therefore a new frame of reference. It
can no longer be seen as Islam versus the West; it
is Islam and the West or Islam in the West. The
growth of this Muslim community has been
impressive to judge by the mosques: both Germany
12
and France have about a thousand, Britain about
500 (although many may only be a room or two). The
central mosques in London and in Washington
symbolize this growth: the mosques are full of
worshippers, they are beautifully constructed and
are the hub of Muslim social and religious activity.
But if there are no theological obstacles for
Muslims in the West there are certainly sociological
and political ones. The Muslim presence in the West
has added fuel to anti-Islamic sentiments. Young
girls wearing the hijab in France have become the
subject of hostile national news; Muslims wanting
separate schools in England are at the centre of a
heated national debate; the Salman Rushdie
controversy continues to involve Muslims and the
majority in a virulent confrontation.
This charged atmosphere encouraged the growth of
European racism dramatically in the 1980s. It was
symbolized by Le Pen in France. So rapidly did his
popularity escalate that few politicians could ignore
his message. Soon, even the distinguished offices of
the French Prime Minister were talking of 'smelly and
dirty immigrants.' It had become fashionable to
speak of immigrants with open contempt. Politicians
called for rigid immigration controls, even for
deportation. This kind of public position was quite
unthinkable only a generation ago when the figleaf of
European humanism would have covered such racist
expressions.
Apart from an increasingly hostile environment in
some Western countries, several other factors have
sharpened the Muslim sense of identity. It is for this
reason that so much alarm is being caused. It
explains the platform for politicians like Le Pen. The
international political climate which changed
dramatically in the 1970s struck a chord among
Muslims in the West. This was the period when King
Faisal of Saudi Arabia used oil as an Islamic weapon
and Imam Khomeini in Iran and General Zia in
Pakistan talked of Islamic revolution and Islamization.
This kind of political leadership triggered Islamic
revivalism throughout the Muslim community,
wherever they lived in the world.
The younger generation
A younger generation of Muslim immigrants has
come of age in the West; about half are now born in
the West as distinct from their parents, who migrated
here in the 1950s and 1960s. The young people
rejected the integration and assimilation that their
parents often desired. They were no longer the
meek, invisible immigrants grateful to be allowed in at
all; they wished to assert themselves. In this situation
issues of race and religion often fused, as growing
racism forced them into a greater sense of religious
identity.
In the mid-1960s, when I was in Cambridge, there
was no place for Friday prayers. Now, in the 1990s,
there are three and they are invariably overflowing
with worshippers on Friday. At various sessions of
Seerat-un-Nabi conferences (in honour of the
Prophet) organized by the Pakistan Cambridgeshire
Association, which I chaired, around 200-250
Muslims, entire families, turned up. This type of
phenomenon appeared to be happening all over the
world. In 1989 on my way to Hawaii for a
conference, I was invited to speak at the recently
constructed mosque in Seattle after the evening
prayer. There were about 200 Muslims present;
many were women - again a sign of our times. The
questions were sharply focused on the role of
Muslims living as a minority.
There is also an economic factor. The younger
generation are better educated than their parents,
who in the UK, for example, had arrived largely to
take up menial jobs as bus conductors or factory
workers. Young Muslims now compete for places at
university with ambitions of becoming doctors and
engineers. They wish to share the good life of the
West, to own smart homes and cars.
Not all analysts are convinced that the signs of
Muslim activity are evidence of Islamic health. Some
of the trends among the younger generation of
Muslims cause pessimism in certain Muslim quarters.
Older Muslims living in the West are worried that
their culture will be weakened over time. For
example, Dr Muzammil H. Siddiqi refers to a recent
study of immigrant Muslim communities in the West
which showed that with each succeeding generation
there was a decline in strict adherence to specific
Islamic values:
Thus it is observed that few Muslims care for five
daily prayers. Some do not feel bad about drinking,
dating and dancing. Some Muslim girls feel there is
nothing wrong in marrying non-Muslims as long as
they love and care for each other. Seventy to eighty
percent of all Muslims do not belong to any Islamic
centre or mosque, and do not care about them.
Many think that Muslim countries (especially the
oil-rich countries) should build mosques for them,
and they do not even contribute one percent of their
income to the Islamic centres and organisations.
13
(Siddiqi 1991:12-13)
The American versus the European experience
There are some interesting differences between the
USA and Europe which help us to understand better
the phenomenon of Muslims living in the West, and
which also highlight the broader historical
differences between the USA and Europe. The main
difference is the social and economic composition of
the Muslim community. In the USA it is largely middle
class doctors, engineers, academics. This gives the
community a greater social confidence and a
positive sense of belonging. In Europe, by and large,
the community remains stuck in the working class or
even the underclass. Its failure on the political scene
is spectacular: although Britain has almost two million
Muslims they have not been able to win a single seat
in Parliament. Worse, their leaders tend to be
divided, particularly over where to draw the line
between integration and traditional Muslim identity;
they seem more interested in attacking each other
than representing the community. Another difference
is that in the USA there is a greater geographical
spread; Muslims are not concentrated in one state or
city. In Europe there is a tendency to concentrate;
Bradford in England is an example. The
concentration allows the leaders of that particular city
to emerge as spokesmen. During the Rushdie crisis
the leaders of Bradford were constantly consulted by
the media and, it was assumed, spoke for the entire
community. It allowed the media to simplify questions
of leadership, values, strategy and organization
among Muslims. Only subsequently did people
realize that although the Bradford spokesmen
broadly reflected the general opinion of Muslims they
were by no means elected or unanimously accepted
leaders of the entire Muslim community of the UK.
The concentration of Muslims in specific
communities has another consequence. The
community can import and perpetuate its sectarian
and ethnic characteristics from home. The traditional
sectarian tensions in Pakistan between the Barelvis
and Deobandis were lifted en bloc to the UK. For the
outsider the differences between these sects are
confusing and difficult to understand. Let me explain
by an example. For the Barelvis, (who are mostly
from the Pakistan province of Punjab) the holy
Prophet is a superhuman figure whose presence is
all around us at all times; he is hazir, present; he is
not bashar, material or flesh, but nur, light. The
Deobandis, who also revere the Prophet, argue he
was the insan-i-kamil, the perfect person, but still
only a man, a mortal. This explains why Kalim
Siddiqui in the UK, demanding the implementation of
the fatwa against Salman Rushdie for insulting the
Prophet, found his most sympathetic audience
among the Barelvis, especially in the network of
mosques that they have organized.
Europe itself has changed dramatically in
relation to its immigrants and their culture. For
example, from the early 1950s to the early 1990s a
number of developments took place in Britain on all
levels of society: from seven curry restaurants to
seven thousand, from a few mosques to 500, from no
African or Asian television presenters and journalists
to dozens, from only a few African or Asian authors
writing in English to a number of Booker Prize
winners. All this was to the good; British culture was
that much richer. But it is easy to understand the
British fear that perhaps too much may have been
happening too fast. After all, Britain is a deeply
conservative and insular society, and no such
foreign influences - and from such far lands - had
made themselves felt before. The fear fed easily into
feelings of racial animosity. Muslims in the USA are
conscious that they are there by choice. They have
opted to be American. America is, after all, the land
of the melting pot, where everyone is ideally equal.
This contrasts with Muslims in Europe. Many feel that
they are in Europe simply because their parents
migrated or were forced to migrate for economic
reasons. This makes for disenchanted and alienated
citizens.
Muslims in Europe have a direct relationship to
the colonial period. The UK ruled South Asia (British
India), and therefore most of its Muslim immigrants
tend to be from Pakistan, India and Bangladesh (of
about two million the biggest single national group is
Pakistani). Moroccans and Algerians drifted to
France (about half a million of the former and one
million of the latter of France's three million Muslims).
Because Germany and Turkey had a relationship
going back to the First World War, Turks went to
Germany (most of Germany's one and a half million
Muslims are Turks). The Netherlands has about half
a million Muslims who are mostly from Surinam. In
Portugal most Muslims are from the former colonies
in India or southern France; in Spain they are from
Morocco or Algeria. In Italy, where there are
estimated to be about 200,000 Muslims, they are
mostly from Libya.
In both the USA and Europe, ideas of local
14
ethnicity also affect Muslim self-awareness. The rise
of black power in the USA helped to create a mood
of assertiveness, of identity, of exaggerated
self-importance in the Muslim community. Black
Muslims like Malcolm X and Muhammad Ali in the
1960s became symbols of Muslim pride. This did not
happen in Europe. There were no superstars to rally
behind. The vast majority of the Muslims were
marginalised in low-paid jobs and there were few
intellectual or media figures speaking on their behalf.
There is also the geo-political factor. The USA is,
by and large, neutral in its dealings with Muslims. So,
while it is seen as anti-Libya, anti-Iran or, more
recently and more famously, anti-Iraq, it is also seen
as an ally of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. Its
relationships, therefore, depend on its geo-political
strategy. Racial or imperial prejudices which often
colour the view of the European powers are less
visible.
Muslim integration in Western nations
It is a common assumption that the Muslim presence
in Europe began after the Second World War; it is
fed by media stereotypes and racist polemics of
Muslims invading and flooding Europe. But the roots
of Muslim immigration go back much further (Nielsen
1992). The origins of the Muslim community in
Germany lie in the close relationship between
Germany and the Ottoman empire through periods of
war and peace. Even earlier, Muslims had settled in
the southern German states after the second siege of
Vienna in 1683. After that period Prussian kings
often employed Muslim soldiers. It is the same link
that allowed the Ottoman sultan to patronize the
mosque built in a Muslim cemetery in Berlin in 1866.
The economic and diplomatic relationship between
Turkey and Germany thus has deep roots. The
picture is the same for France and Britain, where
many immigrants arrived during the last century.
Seamen from Africa and Asia settled in London and
other ports. We know of the early Yemeni
settlements (Halliday 1992). The first mosques were
opened for these seamen, and mosques were then
opened in Woking in 1889 and Liverpool in 1891.
The Liverpool mosque did not survive the outbreak of
the First World War. In 1935 the mosque in Woking
declared its adherence to SunniJslam (earlier it had
been associated with the Ahmedis). Marmaduke
Pickthall and Abdullah Yusuf Ali, whose translations
of the Qur'an into English continue to be read all over
the world, were both associated with this mosque. In
1944 King George VI inaugurated the Islamic
Cultural Centre on a site near Regent's Park in
London, in exchange for a site in Cairo for a new
Anglican cathedral. In due course Britain's main
mosque would be built there.
France shows an even more pronounced pattern
of immigration than Britain before 1945. Mohammad
Ali of Egypt in the last century had encouraged
Egyptian students, scholars and business people to
go to France. Before the First World War immigrants
from Algeria, mostly from the Kabyle tribes, were
drifting to the Marseille region for jobs in the olive oil
refining and related industries. During the First
World War Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians
joined the civil and defence industries. It was in
recognition of this that the French allowed the
opening of a mosque in Paris in 1926. During the
Second World War the Vichy government in 1942
imported North African labour to help Germans in
their war effort. By the time of the 1954 census there
were 200,000 Algerians in France. Immigration was
caused largely by the European governments
themselves, who actively encouraged people from
their former colonies to emigrate to the 'mother
country' because of the need for labour in the
post-war reconstruction. For example, in Britain, at
a time of full employment in the 1950s it was difficult
to recruit people to work in the most menial and
arduous jobs; the governments therefore sought to
attract Asians and West Indians to Britain and
offered them the worst jobs, those that they could not
fill with native British. This occurred throughout
Europe. It is often forgotten by native inhabitants that
Muslims were actually invited by the governments.
Most of these immigrants had no intention of
staying permanently in Europe. But most did. At first
their problems were not so severe. However,
changes were taking place in Europe. The colonies
had disappeared. The economy was stagnant and
the oil prices began to rise sharply. The question of
race was now in the air. European countries reacted
by stricter immigration laws, Britain being the first
with its Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1962. This
did not prevent immigration from continuing and
indeed increasing. But there was a difference: wives
and children were now arriving.
As the governments had only wanted immigrants
for their labour, they tried to restrict immigration
when Muslim men started to bring their families over.
By this time the governments had achieved their
objectives and did not assume responsibility for the
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break-up of Muslim families as a result of migration.
When discussing Muslims in the West we often
overlook the 'local' convert. Many Europeans and
Americans are attracted to Islam, especially its Sufic
strand. Small communities, such as that at Norwich
in the UK, became famous for attracting British
middle-class converts. In the 1970s they drew
attention because many of their members were
academics and intellectuals and some from influential
families. Interestingly, these groups have now been
marginalised by the more noisy, aggressive,
turbulent and ethnic Muslim politics of the 1980s and
1990s.
What can Muslims do to improve their chances
in the West? Some answers are provided by a
sympathetic Christian scholar in the USA (Poston
1991). He believes that five main actions are crucial
for the future well-being and expansion of Islam in
America: (1) The need to develop an indigenous
American leadership: American converts should be
trained quickly and thoroughly for positions of
leadership in order to avoid the categorization of
Islam as a foreign 'cult'. (2) The stereotypical
negative image of Islam must be transformed through
proper use .of the media. (3) Provocative anti-
Christian polemics should be avoided lest they
provoke a strong reaction among Christians (whether
practising or non-practising). (4) Muslims should
attempt to reach more achievable goals by promoting
co-operation among themselves instead of focusing
their concern on homogenizing diverse Muslim
ethnic groups. (5) Muslim individuals should become
involved in dawah (social welfare and missionary)
activities in order to overcome the powerful
assimilative influence of the American mainstream.
These are practical and sensible suggestions, and
most Muslims will find little to argue in them. Many
Muslims may have reached these conclusions
themselves but as communities they are still some
way from implementing them. Unless they do so,
strife will result from their minority position. Muslim
leaders and writers need to do more serious thinking.
Muslims as Minorities
In the last chapter we focussed on countries where Islam
is the dominant religion. In Turkey, Iran and Pakistan -
and in the Arab countries - about 90 to 95 per cent of the
people claim to be Muslims. Many of these countries
use the word 'Islamic' in their self-description; thus the
Islamic Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan, where the Shari'ah is the law of the land. We
will now look at Muslims in countries where the
majority population is not Muslim. The important point
to keep before us is the wide range of the Muslim
experience as minorities. In one place they are
comfortable and adjusted, in another resentful and
deprived; Stornoway in the Outer Hebrides is an example
of the former, Samarkand, under the Soviets, of the
latter. We shall look at both in this chapter. In discussing
the problem of Muslim minorities in my book,
Postmodernism and Islam: Predicament and Promise
(1992), I mentioned Kashmir, Palestine and the Central
Asian republics of the Soviet Union. But events now
make the third example redundant. Over the last few
years we have seen the Soviet Union disintegrate and the
former Soviet republics in Central Asia emerge as
independent states. We can no longer talk of the Muslim
republics as a minority within a non-Muslim majority.
But because their problems derive from their former
situations as a minority we shall discuss them below.
The 'Problem' of Muslim Minorities
It is not difficult to see why Muslims who live as a
minority in non-Muslim countries like India or Israel
are seen by them as a problem. The reasons are
relatively simple. Wherever Muslims live as minorities
they increasingly face problems of discrimination.
These are partly due to historical and political
factors, partly due to the media, which have
confirmed for many that Muslims are violent,
unreliable and prone to anarchy. There is another
reason. Most non-Muslim countries in which Muslims
live have an image of themselves as plural, tolerant,
secular and modern societies. Muslims somehow
challenge this image. They provoke the worst
aspects of the state. In the main, instead of solving
the problems of the Muslims in a manner that would
be mutually beneficial, the state tends to ignore or
minimize them. In the former state of Yugoslavia the
Serbs went one step further with their Muslim
minority. They systematically killed them and drove
them from their homes in Bosnia. The world called it
'ethnic cleansing' and did nothing. Bosnia was added
to the list of recent Muslim losses. What offends
Muslims living in a country as the minority
community? What is the Muslim 'problem'? There are
two or three things that Muslims are most sensitive
about. The most important is religion. Muslims would
like to be able to visit their mosques and say their
prayers peacefully without interruption, without being
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beaten up, without being picked up for interrogation.
They would also like privacy in their homes where
they can lead their lives as Muslims. They would like
dignity and honour for their families - in particular,
for the elderly, the women and the children. They
don't like police or paramilitary forces to burst into
their homes and humiliate their families. They would
like some control over their lives, some perpetuation
of their own customs and values, the construction
and maintenance of mosques which are the focus of
social and cultural life, the capacity to read the
Qur'an and the chance to live as Muslims and by
Muslim traditions. These include family laws,
inheritance, religious holidays and religious festivals.
When these are threatened, Muslims are threatened;
confusion and anger ensue.
It is not difficult for non-Muslim rulers to concede
these facilities to Muslims; when they have been
conceded, Muslims have lived harmoniously. History
confirms this. It is the modern state that creates the
problem. Because the modern state is so centralized
and because it often lacks imagination in dealing with
its minorities, Muslims are constantly under
pressure. Merely wishing for the minimum, Muslims
are seen as people who demand separation and
indeed secession.
There is a cultural problem also for Muslims living
as a minority. Non-Muslim tourists visiting Muslim
holy places cause offence by eating there and
loitering, playing loud music on their radios. Islamic
culture, adab, is directly challenged. In some cases
there is a direct physical threat to these holy places,
such as the demolition of Babar's mosque in
Ayodhya, India. The inevitable religious clashes cost
lives. There is also the more sinister danger of actual
history being changed and Muslim culture being
depicted in official textbooks as barbaric and
worthless (as has happened in Spain). A discussion
of Muslims as a minority is important for several
reasons. First, the populations we are discussing are
large. Indeed, Muslims who live as a minority
constitute about a quarter of the total number of
Muslims. The problem is serious because it is
ongoing and does not involve only one or two
countries - it is global. A list of countries in which
Muslims live as a minority includes the USA, India,
Russia, the UK, France, Germany, Israel and
Singapore. In India alone there are said to be
anywhere around 110 million Muslims. No religion in
the world has so many people trapped in an alien
environment as the Muslims. Neither Christians nor
Jews, nor Hindus, none of the major world religions
have such large numbers in so many countries
dominated by people of other religions.
The second reason is that the sharpest and most
brutal political confrontation is taking place in these
societies. We learn of the most compelling stories of
injustice and brutality as Muslims struggle for
self-dignity and identity. The images that are shown
on television and the reports in the press confirm for
us the plight of the Muslims.
Thirdly, because of the notion of the ummah,
because of the manner of the suppression of these
groups, Muslims in neighbouring countries are
deeply concerned. The struggle of the Kashmiris in
South Asia and the Palestinians in the Middle East
draws in large Muslim populations outside the
national borders. The geo-political situation remains
tense; indeed it can escalate to war at any time. It is
well to recall that the major powers in both areas
have gone to war three or four times because of
these Muslim minorities. Finally, some Islamic ideas
place Muslims and the non-Muslim majority on a
confrontation course. The Islamic ideas are notions
of the ummah, which transcends national borders,
and the idea of jihad, struggle, the need to fight for
a just and correct order. On the other hand, these
non-Muslim nations need to respond to security
requirements and geopolitical strategy. The Muslim
minority is often caught in the crossfire.
There are agonizing dilemmas facing Muslims
living as a minority in certain areas. In a different
time, in a previous age, Muslims persecuted by the
majority could do one of two things: they could pack
up and leave, that is, exercise the right to adopt hijra,
or they could fight for their rights, that is jihad.
Today, because of the power, the highly centralized
security and administrative structures and the
strongly manned borders of state, neither option is
really feasible. Besides, it would be difficult to
exercise the option of hijra. As recent history shows
us, migrant communities do not settle down easily
and merge; they take a long time to do so. Any influx
of large numbers of refugees causes all kinds of
social and political problems to the host community,
however welcoming they may have been at first.
This leaves the option of jihad. That too is
difficult in our age. A small deprived minority cannot
easily take on the power of the state, but it can try.
The attempt to assert independence, to fight for one's
dignity and culture, explains what is going on in
Kashmir and Palestine. Communication between the
17
government and these groups appears to have
broken down. For Muslims the state is represented
by the brute force of soldier and policeman. The
women in the area live in dread of their honour and
dignity being violated; young males are in the
constant fear of being picked up for interrogation
and torture at any time on any flimsy pretext. For the
elders there appears to be no real alternative but to
give free rein to the youth in their attempt to break
loose and create their own response to the world,
whatever the costs. It is a dreadful choice, full of
pain and disruption. But when dialogue breaks down
it appears to be the only one open for the time being.
An important aspect of these movements is their
direct involvement with the geo-politics of the region.
The Kashmir movement is seen in India as entirely a
creation of Pakistan. This perception is simplistic
and disregards numerous factors: the notion of the
ummah which generates sympathy for Muslims
wherever they are in trouble (although the Kashmiri
cause has great sympathy in Pakistan, so does the
Palestinian one); the strong feelings of injustice in
Pakistan regarding the legality of the state of
Kashmir and the manner it was incorporated into
India; the many Kashmiris who have settled in
Pakistan; the failure of the central government over
the last decades to integrate these areas into the
larger body of the nation. All these factors militate
against integration. There are also certain Muslims
who out of enthusiasm or ignorance or even mischief
would make demands which not only clash with the
state but suggest its disintegration. These create
problems for everyone concerned. For instance Dr
Kalim Siddiqui's call for a Muslim parliament created
all kinds of doubts in Britain in the early 1990s. Did
Muslims want to create their own country in Britain?
Did they want independence? Were their threats of
forcing an Islamic order on to Britain to be taken
seriously? Such questions obviously cause
resentment and anger in the majority. This reaction,
when fed into the existing stereotypes about the
minority, creates a sense of contempt and revulsion
against it. Muslims appear to be largely unaware of
this aspect of their relationship with the majority.
The inexplicable fear of Muslim minorities
I find it surprising, even intriguing, that there is such
a pronounced fear of Muslim minorities, whether in
India or in Israel. In India it is even reflected in its
attitude towards Pakistan. India, a country far larger
in size, its armies and air force always maintaining
a ratio of four or five to one, and now with a
sophisticated nuclear programme, lives in strange
psychological fear of Pakistan, the smaller, poorer,
lesser-armed country.
Similarly, the Israeli notion of the Arab threat is
exaggerated. Here is a modernized nation
possessing one of the most sophisticated defence
services of the world, including a wide range of
nuclear weapons. It is supported by the USA, which,
when there is war against the Arabs, enters the fray
with an almost unlimited supply of the most
up-to-date weapons. Israel faces poorly equipped
armies often manned by demoralized soldiers. Arab
leaders are usually politically divided whatever their
rhetoric of wiping Israel off the face of the earth. Yet
Israeli leaders sound like David facing Goliath. It
must be, I imagine, the atavistic fear of Muslim
warriors in the past. Nothing else could explain the
neurosis of such powerful countries contemplating
their weaker Muslim neighbours. These are deep and
complex psychological fears, but they need to be
confronted if they are to be laid to rest.
Muslim governments have rarely exhibited this
tension with regard to minorities. Minorities have
always been part of many Muslim countries and on
the whole they have been left alone, indeed often
participating in the state by holding the highest
positions. The problem is therefore not only of the
minority but of the majority. If the majority is a little
bit more tolerant and imaginative it will be able to deal
with the minorities more fairly and more kindly, and
Muslims in return would respond more positively.
Power is both corrupting and dangerous when it is
unchallenged and concentrated in the hands of the
majority as it is in Israel and India. The non-Muslim
voices of tolerance and compassion are easily
drowned.
In the selection of officers for defence and the
civil services and in the distribution of economic
permits and sanctions, the state tends to encourage
the oppression of the minorities. It also does so by
suggesting a certain kind of Muslim as a 'good'
Muslim in the media. The definition is centred on
someone who is prepared to abandon Muslim
customs and indeed faith. He or she thus becomes
a good or moderate Muslim. In contrast anyone
wishing to assert their culture and identity is seen as
a fanatic or a I fundamentalist - in the terms of the
state, a troublemaker, a separatist, a communal
creature.
The resources of the state are infinite, the
18
energy of the security forces and their strength is
inexhaustible. In comparison the protesting individual
has limited resources and lives at the centre of a web
spun by the state. The fact that Muslim groups have
fought so long for their rights simply underlines the
desperation of their position. Imagination and
wisdom demand that the state responds to them with
understanding and tolerance. Using more force,
more torture and more suppression implies not only
the failure of the state but a serious misreading of
the situation.
The burden of the immigrant
But the position is more complex than a
straightforward clash between majority and minority.
What is not so well known in this context is that
Muslim groups fleeing to neighbouring Muslim
countries have also had a difficult time. The Muslims
of India who migrated to Pakistan found a great deal
of succour and support in the early days. In recent
years, however, a confrontation has developed
between them and the local majority based on ethnic
and economic factors. Refugees from India were
seen as monopolizing better jobs. Notions of cultural
superiority, language differences and ideological
arguments about identity all widened the gap
between the minority and the majority. The result was
that in the last decades we have seen these very
minorities in direct conflict with the majority
population - although both are Muslim. So while
Sindhis battled it out with refugees from India in the
Sind province - of Pakistan the Jordanian
government fought it out with the Palestinians using
tanks and heavy weapons to dislodge them. It was a
cruel, paradoxical and even unexpected
development. But it showed how deeply
interconnected countries and problems were, how
impossible it was to view the problem of the
minorities in isolation.
By the time of the Gulf War in 1991 we saw how
the role of the Palestinians affected and divided Arab
opinion. Because of their support for Saddam
Hussain - which seemed to have developed only
because of his vocal support for them - they were
victimized and bounded out of countries that had
once allowed them employment. The ideological and
emotional support for their cause was clearly
subordinated to the antipathy they were arousing by
their political position.
The Afghan refugees arriving in Pakistan provide
another example. Although they were welcomed
when they arrived in the late 1970s, most Pakistanis
soon began to view them with unease and then open
resentment. Stories of kidnapping, drug-smuggling
and robbery were publicly linked to them, and
Pakistanis began asking their guests when they
would return. Similarly, the Muslim minorities
appeared to be out of step with the majority in
Britain. During the Gulf War the Muslim conference
in Bradford which claimed to speak for all Muslims in
the country unanimously supported Saddam against
Britain. British Muslims were concerned about the
bloodshed and damage that would be inflicted on the
Iraqi people. They were right to be concerned. But it
also convinced many in Britain that here was a
potential fifth column, a minority which in the middle
of a war situation was prepared to side with the
enemy. The leaders of the Muslim minority were out
of tune with the times. The racial harassment that
followed was only to be expected. It would have been
far worse if the war had continued and large
numbers of British soldiers had died. Coffins coming
home would have triggered racial violence on an
unprecedented level. Fortunately for the British
Muslims, the war ended quickly. As there was no
hand-to-hand fighting or set-piece military
engagements, British casualties were at a minimum.
But the British majority had been made aware that
the Muslim community had voted against them.
Henceforth a question mark would hang over the
loyalty of the British Muslims.
Sufism the Universal Way
In the midst of accounts of prejudice, alienation and
anguish there is a success story of integration and
harmony. It is located in the unlikely setting of the
Outer Hebrides, off the Scottish coast.
Sufism is Islam's tolerant, mystical and universal
philosophy. Its message of sulh-i-kul, peace with all,
has endeared it to both Muslims and non-Muslims
alike. It appeals to all Muslim sects and social
classes. One has only to visit shrines such as that of
the Sufi saint at Ajmer in India and observe the
stream of Muslim and non-Muslim visitors for
confirmation of this (see chapter 3). Sufis see the
unity of God, tawhid, in everything and everyone.
Although in its vulgar or more populist forms Sufism
has acquired distinctly un-lslamic practices, but
nevertheless its origin is unimpeachable, tracing
back to the Prophet himself. The Sufi must first
19
master the Shar'iah, the true path of Islam, before
venturing onto the tariqah, the Sufi way.
Sufi masters are central figures for their
disciples in helping to unravel the mysteries and
ideas of Sufism. The first and primary function of the
Sufi master is what may be called ego-busting and
that is to diminish the individual ego in order to
establish the supremacy of God. To aid this,
numerous exercises are devised, most of them
baffling to the layman. Many stories are told of how
Sufi masters instruct their disciples. There are tales
of princes who, on entering the Sufi circle, are
ordered to clean latrines. As with all things Sufic,
many layers of meaning lie beneath the surface. The
idea is first to deconstruct and then to reconstruct
the seeker of truth before the tariqah can be
understood. These esoteric practices allow Sufis to
endure hard times, even times of persecution. One
such practice is the ritual of dhikr, mention of the
name of Allah. Each of the ninety-nine names is
known to contain a special quality. Pronouncing and
repeating the name in a special manner produces a
spiritual state in the believer. Dhikr kept Islam alive in
Central Asia during the harsh days of Soviet rule
(see chapter 5). The following prayer sums up the
spirit of Sufism. It is from the Naqshbandi order
associated with Bahauddin Naqshband, the saint of
Bukhara, who lived in the fourteenth century (and
whom we shall meet again in chapter 5). The
universal strands of Islam are clearly visible; it could
be the prayer of any religion, anywhere in the world:
Oh my God, how gentle art thou with him who
has transgressed against thee: how near art thou to
him who seeks thee, how tender to him who
petitions thee, how kindly to him who hopes in thee.
Who is he who asks of thee and thou dost deny
him or who sought refuge in thee and thou dost
betray him and drew near to thee and thou dost
hold him aloof? And fled unto thee and thou dost
repulse him?
The all-pervading and tolerant spirit of the Sufis is not
surprising when we consider their sources of
inspiration. Although the Prophet is their ultimate
model, other spiritual figures - which include
Abraham, Moses and Jesus - also mould them. This
is enunciated in 'The Eight Qualities of the Sufi' by
a well-known Sufi master, Junaid of Baghdad:
In Sufism, eight qualities must be exercised.
The Sufi has:
Liberality such as that of Abraham;
Acceptance of his lot, as Ismail accepted;
Patience, as possessed by Job;
Capacity to communicate by symbolism, as
in the case of Zachariah;
Estrangement from his own people, which
was the case with John;
Woollen garb like the shepherd's mantle of
Moses;
Journeying, like the travelling of Jesus;
Humility, as Muhammad had humility of
spirit. (Shah 1990:246)
For me personally, Sufism's message of
compassion, humility and universal love is attractive
and inspiring. But what is a youngster, soaked in the
materialist urban milieu in which television provides
the greatest input, to make of Sufism? How would he
or she understand Sufi stories? The following tale
from the celebrated Mathnawi of the greatest of Sufi
masters, Rumi, illustrates the point. A disciple
seeking the Sufi path finally feels he has mastered it
and arrives to announce this to his master. He
knocks on the door and when asked 'Who is there?'
answers, 'It is I.' The master says, 'Go away, you
have not yet acquired knowledge. ' He leaves to
return after he has performed more spiritual
exercises, and this time when asked who is knocking
says 'It is Thou'. 'Come in,' says the master. 'There
is no room for two in this house.'
This Sufi story illustrates the layers of understanding
that lie in Sufism: the obliteration of the ego, the
need for the master who will help the quest for
knowledge along the divine path, and the search for
the true way, the way of God, however difficult and
esoteric. These stories are allegories, metaphors,
stories within stories, and like the layers of an onion
they require patience to peel and they sometimes
end in tears.
Sufism is not calculated to be popular or understood
in an age that is dominated by the media, by the
sound bite, by simplistic analysis, by the noise and
thunder of the sound-track and by a cynical
irreverence (see chapter 6). Our age demands
simple heroes - Superman, James Bond, Indiana
Jones. Themes that remind us of the transience of
our life on earth, that point to the I mysteries of
existence, the complexity of being, are not readily
accepted.